The desire for esteem, and the assodated des ire for goo d reputation, serve an important role in ordinary sociallife in disdplining interact ions and supporting the operation of social norms. The fact that many Internet relations are conducted under separate dedicated e-identities may encourage the view that Internet relations are not susceptible to these esteem-related incentives. We argue t hat this view is mistaken. Certainly, pseudonyms allow individuals tomoderate the effects of disesteem-either by changing the pseudonym to avoid the negative reputation, or by partitioning various audienc es according to different audience values. However, there is every reason to believe that a good e-reputation is an object of des ire for rea l agents. Further, althou gh integra ting one's reputation under a single identity has som e esteem-enhandng features, those features are not necessarily dedsive. We explore in t he paper what some of the countervailing considerations might be, by appea l to various analogies with the Internet case.
Esteem, R eputation and the 'Compounding Effect'
"Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in thei r favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard." (Ada m Smith 1759 /1982 We assume in this paper, in line with wh a t we have argu ed elsewh ere (Brennan/ Pettit 2004) , that people desire the esteem of others and shrink from t h eir disesteem. In ma king this assumption, we a re deliberately associating ourselves w ith an intellectual tradition tha t dominated social theor izing until the n ineteenth century, a nd specifically until the emerge nce of modern economics. That tradition includes Adam Smith, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, the Baron d e M ontesquieu, D avid Hume----indeed, just about everyone who is r ecognized as a forebear of modern social and political theory, w h eth er specifically in the econ omistic st yle or not. The re is scarcely a social theorist up to the nin et eent h century w ho does not regard t h e desire for esteem as amon g the most ubiquitous a nd powerful motives of huma n ac tion (Lovejoy 1961) . Sm ith's elegantly forthright formulation , offer ed as the epigraph to this section, simply exem plifies the w ider tradition.
• T h e writing of thi s paper was stimulated by our participation in a conference on 'Trust on the Intemet ' h eld in Bielefeld, Gerrnany in July 2003. The current v ersion owes much t o Michael Baurmann for excellent editorial comments.
We can think of a minimalist version of the basic esteem relationship as involving just two individuals-an actor A, and an observer, B. The actor u ndertakes some action, or exhibits some disposition, that is observed by B. The observation of this action/ disposition induces in B an immediate and spontaneaus evaluative attitude. That attitude can be either positive (esteem ) or negative (disesteem). B h as this response, we think, simply as a result of her being the kind of evaluative creature that humans are.
1 Crucially for t he ' economy of esteem', B's evaluative attitude is itself an object of A's concer n: as the economist might put it, B's attitude is an argument in A's u tility functionpositively valued by A in the case of esteem, and negatively valued in t he case of disesteem. In short, A cares what B thinks of him, and is prepared to act in order to induce B tothink better (or less badly) of him. To the ext ent t hat prevailing values are matters of common awareness, A's desire for positive esteem (and the desire to avoid disesteem) will induce A to behave in accord with t hose values.
The esteem that accrues and the corresponding behavioural incentive will b e greater:
• the gr eater the likelihood tha t A will b e observed-a t least over a conside rable range. The significan ce of the proviso we sh all explor e in section 4 below;
• the larger the size of the relevant audien ce;
• a nd the high er is a udience quality-with 'quality' h er e u nder st ood in t erms of attentiveness, capac ity to d iscriminate, cap acity to prov ide valued testimony a nd so on. Audie nce quality is also a matter of t he est eem wh ich observers themselves enjoy in the relevant domain. If m ore esteemed observers esteem you, tha t both t ends to augment the self-esteem you e njoy a nd also gives gr eater cr edibility and effect to a ny t estimony those observers provide on your b ehalf. Now, it should b e clear tha t the Internet is a settin g in which observation is assured, wh ere there is a la rge audie nce on offer , and where at least some p roportion of tha t audience can b e assumed to b e 'high quality' in t he sense indicated. So, for example, if you post a solution to a difficult softwar e p rob lern on the mailing list of linux-experts, 2 you will immed iately have a very large a udien ce, a nd moreover one composed of highly qualified a nd h ighly attentive readers. The t echnology provides rela tively open access t o much larger, and more d edicated a udien ces tha n a re typically available in the 'real' world . T his fact immedia t ely suggests tha t est eem may play an especially important role on the Interne t; a nd tha t the b e havioural incentives t o act 'pr operly', as prevailing values under stand that t erm, will b e especially potent in t h e Internet set ting.
Ther e is, h owever, a n interesting feature of Inte rnet relations t hat m ight mode rate the stren gth of these a udience effects, a nd is, in a ny event, wort h some detailed exploration in its own right. To focus on w h a t is a t stake, it is necessary to say a little about the relation between esteem and reputa tion.
Reputation in the sense of brand name recognition can clearly materialize without esteem or disesteem. Equally, esteem or disesteem ca n accrue wit hout any reputational effects. When you behave badly by prevailing standa r ds, observers who witness your conduct will think ill of you whet her or n ot t hey will be able to identify you in the future, and whether or not you a r e ever likely to meet them again. And this fact can induce you to behave b et t er-without any reputational effects as such.
However, reputational effects do serve to increase t h e esteem stakes. If the observer can recognize you in the future, then you stand to enjoy esteem (or suffer disesteem) not only at the point of actual perfor man ce but also lat er when you are recognized as 'the person who did X'. And further, if your identity is communicable to others, then you can be rec ognized as 'the on e who did X' by all those within the community of discourse, a nd specifically those who were not witnesses of the original action. Both prop erties-fut ure r ecognition and communicability-are involved in reputation. In t h is sense, r eputation serves t o extend the time fra m e and the effective a udience over which t h e esteem / disest eem can b e sust ained , and to m agnify t he corresponding esteem incentive to b eh ave in accord with prevailing v alues.
In what we take to b e the 'normal case', esteem a nd d isesteem, and rep utation good or b ad, will acc rue in a process in which t h e indiv idu al's iden tity is clear a nd unproblema tic. But the Internet is ofte n-per haps typically-n ot a 'normal case' in this sense. For it is a routine feature of m any for ms of Internet interaction s that individuals develop Internet-specific id entities. That is, ma ny p eople choose to op er a te on the Inte rnet under an alias, 'virt u al' identities, w hich are distinct from their 'real' identities. And t his p h enom en on of multiple identities is som ething of a puzzle in the esteem contex t , b ecause it seems to sta nd against wh a t we t a ke to b e a n importa n t feature of the st ruc t ure of esteem. This feature we shall term the 'compounding effect ' , and we turn immedia t ely to explain wha t it is .
Esteern and disesteem accrue to the actor by virtue of p erfor mance in one or other of t h e e ntire ra n ge of evalua ted dispositions or actions. O n e is est eemed for on e's b en evole nce, or one's courage or one's musical prowess or one's putting a bility. Reput ations a re similar: on e d evelops a re putation f or som ething. Esteem and r eputation, b oth, are activity-sp ecific. This does not m ean, t hou gh, tha t we ca nnot give sense to the idea of the esteem a person e njoys in t oto, or to his r eputation over all. The est eem acquired in each field w ill be aggregated in som e way to form over all est eem. The reputation in t h e various d omains w ill add up t o the p erson's overall reputation. The precise way in which t hese activity-sp ecific reputations aggregate to form over all r ep utation is an imp orta nt m atter ; and the sp ecific assumption we shall make in t his connection is t his: other things equal, positive ( and negative) reputations compound across do mains. So if A enjoys a fine r eputa tion within his profession, and a fine r epu tation in t h e particular sp orting a nd a rtistic avocation s he pursues, and has a reputation for hon est y, gen erosity a nd so on, then his overall r eputat ion will b e better by virtue of the variety. Each element in his reputation serves to augment the other elements in such a way that the whole tends to b e larger than t he sum of the parts. Obversely, if A's reputation in a range of areas is n egative or merely mediocre, these reputational elements will also tend to be mutually supportive, though in a negative direction.
It might be helpful here to think of overall esteem or overall reputation in terms of a functional form that reflects the relevant p roperty. So let A's total reputation be r!A, where:
where RA(X), RA(Y) > 0 and c is some positive constant.
(1)
A person who had a positive reputation in some domains and a n egative one in others would have the positive a nd negative elements separately combined as in equation (1) and simply added.
The force of this assumption in the current context is that it creates a presumption in favour of A's h aving a single identity for r eputational purposes. Having a positive reputation for X somehow m aintained separ ately from the positive reputation for Y involves forgoing the benefits associated with the final term of (1 )-the 'compounding effect', as we denote it. Of course, the benefits of compounding m ay be offset by other considerations in special cases. But our formulation means tha t these 'oth er consider a tions' h ave t o b e sp ecified.
The problern we face is to explain how it could make sense for people on the Internet to multip ly their identities in this way, putting out a variety of person as in place of their real, universally identifiable self. The problem, in p art icular, is to explain this under the assumption that p eople desire esteem and r eputation. Is the phenom enon to be explained by technical features of the In ternet? O r does it have a larger life in the economy of esteem? Whatever its source, wh at effect does multiple identity h ave on the b eh avioural incentives associated with esteem? Theseare the questions w ith which this paper w ill be concerned.
Our stra t egy in addressing them is som ewhat indirect. We b egin by considering three cases in which identity is an apparently critical factor, b ut where the d istinctive technical features of the Internet are not present. This t ask occupies us in section 2. We then examine in som e d etail the variety of motives t h at seem to b e in play in t hose cases. In section 3 we explore the use of (or effects of) anonymity as an insurance strategy; in section 4, the use of anonymity as an esteem-optimising strategy; and in section 5, a variet y of other considerations that seem to b e in play when anonymity is invoked. In section 6, we seek to examine the relevance of this a n alysis drawn from these cases for the Inte rnet case specifically; and draw some appropria tely tentative conclusions.
Three Cases Somewhat Analogous to the Internet
The cases we consider all involve identity and reputat ional issues; b ut are n ot subject to the technical peculiarities of the Internet set t ing. The cases are:
• the use of the pseudonym;
• the resort to name change;
• and the creation of a secret society.
Of these, the pseudonym seems to offer the closest analogue to wh a t h app ens on the Internet. But the case of name change is similar in som e respec ts and may offer some insight into motives for use of pseudonyms on t h e Internet. And as weshall try to show, consideration of the secret society cases, t h ough somewhat removed, can also offer some insight into motives for, and/ or the consequences of, the use of Internet pseudonyms.
Pseudonyms
The characteristic feature of the pseudony m case is t h a t indiv iduals op er a t e under a variety of names simulta neously. Each of these n ames can give rise to a reputa tion and each of those reputa tions can b e a source of public esteem. There is, in fact, an interesting variety of cases; and it w ill b e useful h er e t o provide some examples.
In theatrical and cinema tic circles, the practice of t h e 'professional stagename' is so fa miliar as t o b e unremarka ble. Indeed, op erating under one's original birth-na m e seems to b e the exception. In some small number of cases, t h e reason for adopting a stage-name (differ ent from one's birt h-name) is t hat the birth-name is already in use as a stage-name by someone else. So for example, James Stewart (birth-name) adopted a screen-na m e (J a mes C agney) becau se J immie Stewart was already an establish ed screen p er sonality. In general, h owever , the motiva tion is quite different: it is to secure a n ame w ith t h e right combina tion of salience and associa tive prope rties, much like the choice of brand name or name for a n ew product. In the screen cases, the screen persona is such a d ominant asp ect of the actor's life, and so constitutive of t h e actor 's r eput ation, that the individuals a r e usually known by t h eir screen-names off-scr een as well as on. The choice of pseudonym in su ch cases is the n mor e like a n ame-ch ange, a nd ought probably b e consider ed in that setting .
The literary context is anoth er in which the u se of p seudonyms is commonor a t least h as been so a t som e p eriods of litera r y history. B ut h ere the specifically multiple-identity prop erty seems more relevant.
In the eighteenth century, the p ractice of w riting under a n om-de-plume (int er estingly a 'nom-du-guerre' in Fren ch) seem s to h ave been the ru le rath er than the exception-t h ough more for n ovelists than for p oets. 3 Just h ow ext ensive a practice this has been can be gauged by consulting one or another of t he several dictionaries of pseudonyms that are now available-d ictionaries that r u n to hundreds of pages and contain thousands of entries. See, for example, Carty (1996) and Room (1989). 4 Some examples will serve to illustrate the variety:
• Throughout the eighteenth century most commentators on p olitical affairs, including the authors of much significant political t heory, wrote under pseudonyms. Ha milton, J ay and Madison writing as Publius is only on e notable example of a very widespread practice. The so-called Cato letters are another. J ohn Adams wrote as Marcellus (among t h e eighteenth century political essayists, classical names, even invented ones, were p opular). In many such cases, the authors were themselves political figures-and the pseudonym might have served partly to protect them in their political roles from criticism associated with their published views.
• Fernale novelists through eighteenth and nineteenth cen t mies frequen tly wrote under male pseudonyms. So, for example, t he famous cases of Maryann Evans ('George Eliot') a nd the Bronte sisters wr iting t h eir early efforts as the brothers Bell-Acton, Currer and Ellis . It is naturalto think that the motive here was p rimarily to avoid gender prejudice. H owever , interestingly, Jane Austen published Sense and Sensibility under the authorship of 'a Lady'-specifically not 'a Gentleman '-indicating the p rese nce of other considerations. Perhaps tobe identified as an a uthor was n ot a source of positive esteem in all the quarters in which Austen moved.
• Walter Scott wrote his first historical novel Waverley anonymously, and his n ext few efforts in the genre wer e publish ed under t h e epithet 'by the auth or of Waverley'. At the time Waverley appeared, Scott had already something of a reputation as a writer of heroic and r om antic poetry, and is reputed to have b een concerned that the historical n ovels might tarnish his reputation in the p oetic field. In the same spirit , T h omas Hardy's early novels Desperate Remedies, and then three years later Far From the Madding Crowd, were written a nonymously-again at a time when Hardy aspired to a reputation primarily as a poet.
• David Cornwell, a civ il servant in the Brit ish foreign office, t h rough the 1960's and 1970's, wrote his espion age novels under t h e pseudonym, J ohn le Carre, presumably to protect his employer s from any taint of association.
• C h a rles Dodgson, Oxford mathem a ticia n and pr ecursor of modern social ch oice t h eory, publish ed his literary inventions, told originally as stories to the daughter of friends, under the pseudonym Lewis Carroll.
• Especially interesting in the current context are t he cases of Stendahl and Voltaire. Voltaire (real name Francais Marie Arouette) wrote u nder no fewer than 176 different pseudonyms. Stendahl (Marie Henri Beyle) had as many as 200, including that of Henri Brulard, under which h e published his autobiography! Among English novelists, Thackeray probably holds the record, with a portfolio of pseudonyms running to about sevent y or so (but clearly well short of the Stendahl/ Voltaire standard).
In lots of these cases, the motives for the use of pseudonyms have been matters of (subsequent) public disclosure by the authors involved. But of course such disclosures are not always to be taken at face value. And in many ot her cases, the motives remain mysterious and can only be the object of sp ecula tion. In particular, the use of a very large number of pseudonyms, all for writings that are essentially alike in audience and character, seems bizarre. It is as if the author wished to set aside the benefits of esteem a nd reputation-for any of the individual personas adopted. Presumably in some cases, t he multiplicit y of names is just evidence of a playful spirit. In some, the choice of aut horial persona becomes itself an element in the entire fictional effort: author n a me opera t es as a kind of imaginative framing of the larger narrative. N evert heless, there is a puzzle here for the analysis of esteem, especially in cases wh ere the esteem a ttached to the pseudonym is considera ble.
Name Changes
Na m e change is different from the use of a pseudony m, b eca use the pseud onyma us person operates by the original name in at least som e circles. A pseudonym involves in tha t sense 'multiple identities' a m ong the various p ublies in wh ich the individual operates. N a me change involves the choice of a n ew identity. A few illustrative examples will again be helpful.
• Joseph Stalin [IosifVissarionovich Dzhugashvili], p erha ps following Lenin' s example, altered his name-probably with a n eye to the referen ce to steel ('stal'). Salien ce and me morability are relevant ch aracterist ics in a name for an over-weaning ambition, whether on stage or in polit ics.
• The British R oyal family alte red their names during t h e F irst World Warfrom Wettin to Windsor, Beck to Cambridge, Battenbe rg t o Mount b attent o dista n ce them selves from their German cousins (and common gran dfather). In fact they did so remarkably late in t h e war-after Amer ican entry-and re portedly with great r eluctance and only after considerable political pressure had been brought to bea r.
• Countless immigrants to the US had name-changes t hr ust u p on t h em by immigration offleials impa tient with the eccentricities of 'u npr onounceable' n a m es. Presumably, some victims were complicit in this p rocess, seeking t o esta blish a m ore 'local' identity. The practice of J ews ch a n ging t h eir n a m es is n ot unfamiliar and the motivations for d oing so presu mab ly r eflect a d esire for assimila tion into 'mainstream' so ciet y.
• The ecclesiastical practice (mainly Roman) of individuals changing names as they enter orders, or become popes, is worth noting here. In t his context, the name change is taken to be sacramental: it signifies t h e new identity associated with the 'new life' on which the individual is taken to be embarking. Presumably a similar symbolic elemen t is at stake in the (increasingly contested) practice of women changing surnames at m arriage: the change is designed to signify the 'new life' t hat the p a r tners take on in their joint enterprise. Currently common variants involve both parties altering their names to some amalgam of the originals--often a simple hyphenated version of both surnames--or, occasionally, t h e male partn er taking his wife's surname. This latter practice indicat es that, alth ough the tradition of the female pa rtner's identity being absorbed into the male's is now often identified as objectionable on gender-equity ground s, t he practice of name change as such can have independent significance.
Secret Societies
The case of the secret society may seem to be rather different in ch aract er from that of individual pseudonym s and name changes, b ut from a n esteem perspective there a re some significant similarities. Societies, like individuals, can bear reputation s; and members often derive significant esteem (or disesteem) from the associations of which they are part. When the mem bership of the society is secret, h owever, the esteem connections to m embers are blocked. So, by 'secret' h ere, we h ave in mind the case in which the membership of the society is secret-not the case in which the existence of the association is secret. In t he case of societies that have a negative r ep utation, or t hat have essentially underhand activities to pursue, the reasons for secrecy are clear e nough. Members prefer to avoid the disesteem that would attach to them if their m emb ership of the society were known. But not all secr et societies are t he object of disesteem.
Take two examples. 'The Apostles' at Cambridge University is a society of the putatively most clever a nd accomplish ed students at the U niversity. It is a very considerable honour t obe a member. But the membership is entirely secret. At least on the face of things, me mbers would seem to do better in the esteem stakes if their membership were to become public. If the desire for esteem is ubiquitous, as we have claimed, w hy would the indiv idual Apostles rationally forgo esteem they might otherwise accrue? Why would they vote to retain rules of secrecy? The case is, on the face of things, puzzling.
Or consider the Bourbaki case. 'Nicolas Bourba ki' was a collectiv e pseudon ym adopted by a group of French mathematicians writing during the 1930's, 40's a nd 50's. To t he scholarly community, it appeared that Bourbaki was a single sch olar-a nd one of very considerable distinction, since much foun dational work in algebr a was perp etrated at 'his' hands. As in the Apostles' case, Bourbaki enjoyed a very distinguished r eputation and the indiv idual m athematicians who con stituted the Bourba ki m embership seem to have fo rgon e much est eem t h a t would h ave been on offer had t h eir identity been made p ublic. If, as we have claimed, esteem is indeed a n object of desire, w hy the secrecy?
This question seems a serious puzzle for the esteem account and so we shall want to address it in greater detail in the ensuing three sections. Before d oing so, however, it is worth emphasizing that not all name-modifica tions connect to anonymity, either partial or total.
Many name changes seem tobe either a quest for something memorable (as in the film-star or Stalin examples) or a desire to dissociate from a n earlier identity (as in the assimilation cases or more mundane cases of ex-convicts-the Jean Valjean case, to take a literary example). Equally, t he desire t o associate specifically with a new identity-as in the papal or marital examples. All of these cases can be explained in reputational and esteem terms; they clearly present no challenge to the esteem account.
Equally, where one operates pseudonymously because t he activity in which one is involved is likely to refl.ect poorly on one's reputation in some other m ore significant arena, there is no esteem-related puzzle. This is simply a case of partial secrecy, where the secrecy can itself be explained as an esteem-augmenting strategy.
5 The puzzle arises only where the activity is a (possibly significant) source of positive esteem, and yet the pseudonym is retained. This case seems more like the secret society case, and demands further exploration.
Anonymity as an Insurance Strategy
The first line we take in resolution of the question raised is to observe t hat seeking anonymity, whether in the pseudonym, the n ame ch ange, or t he secret society cases, can have important value as a n insurance strategy. We illustrate the idea with reference to the pseudonym though it clearly extends, with obvious amendments, to the other cases.
Whatever the precise motives for adopting a pseudonym, it is clear that d oing so h as certain consequences; and on e of the m or e important of these involves attitude to risk. Consider the case mentioned above of Walter Scott. As h e embarks on Waverley, it is not that he is convinced that the admirer s of h is poetry will necessarily think that historical novels are an inferior genre. They may; but he just doesn't know . More generally, he do esn 't know h ow the n ovel will be received. It is a n experiment. If it works well, it will doubtless redound to his credit . But if it works badly, his reputation will suffer.
The pseudony m is a mechanism for managing this risk. If the novel is poorly received in general, or if it is poorly regarded by Scot t 's literary peer s in particular, h e can simply give up w riting n ovels a nd stick to poetry, with n o effect on his reputation one way or the other. Or h e may continue to write t he novels bu t d o so anonymously or pseudonymously (as 'the author of Waverley') . If on the oth er h a nd, the novel is a huge lite rary su ccess, he can declare h is identit y and turn to novel-writing in a more public way. There is a p otential up-side benefit if successful; but no down-side loss if not. The pseudony m (or anonym) oper-ates as an insurance policy. Like most insurance policies, it costs something. In Scott's case, for example, his reputa tion as a poet may well have been expected to sell a few more copies of the b ook. Forgoing this market advant age is a p rice that pseudonymity imposes; but it is a small price to pay to avoid t he possibility of ridicule from one's peers.
The dictionaries of pseudonyms do not record (the probably vast ) n umber of authors whose pseudonymously written books sold only a few copies and who sank into obscurity. There must have been many. We do not know of them, precisely because their fa ilures as authors were not matters of which t h ey themselves ever made much ado-for good esteem-based reasons. The great advantage of the pseudonym is tha t it can be discarded shou ld t h ings n ot work out. Perhaps the failing author will try again under anoth er p seudonym: it can be n o advantage to advertise one's work as by the author of som e notoriou s flop. The best strategy seems to be to just move on to anot h er persona until one of one's works takes off. And if no works do take off, we will never h ear of the pseudonym, or the real identity that lies behind it.
Of course, once the reputa tion has been secured, whether pseudonymously or otherwise, t he propensity to take risks is largely r emoved. The pseudonym p rov ides an insurance policy only in the case where on e has nothin g to lose by failure. Once the r eputa tion is established, a failure costs something in terms of diminished r eputation. Even if the reputation at t ach es on ly to the pseudonym (so tha t the author's r eal ide ntity remains undisclosed) , that reputation is still valuable to its generator and still a source of genuine est eem. If on e is seriously worried a b out the success of on e's newest book, then on e might well choose to write it under a different pseudonym fro m one's earlier successful efforts: but the n on e forgoes the ex ante reputational advantages for sales. On ce the reputation is established, tha t particular pseudonym can not act as a n insurance policy any further. One might, thou gh, having establish ed a r eputation un der one pseudonym, use a nother for one's next book. One can always annou nce ex post that p seudonym 1 a nd pseudonym 2 are the same p erson, even if t h e real identity re mains undisclosed.
Ther e remains a n obvious question however. Why n ot disclose the real identity? It is hardly surprising t h at, in cases like Scott 's a nd Hardy's where the risky action paid off, a non ymity was immedia t ely discarded. W h en an insurance policy no longer protects you, it is not sensible t o cont inue t o p ay the premiums. So though insurance motives can explain the adoption of a pseudonym, they cannot explain the r etention of on e. For tha t, we have t o look to oth er considerations. And we shall explore some further possibilities in the ensuing sections.
In the m eantime h owever, we should emphasize t h at t he p seudony m encourages much action that would not b e undertaken. We do not kn ow whether Scott would have embarked on the Waverley n ovels and their sequels if h e had n ot had t h e protection of doing so anonymously. If prevailing regulat ions or literary conventions had r equired total disclosure of a uthor sh ip, it seems at least con ceivable that those novels would n ever have seen the light of day. In this way, t h e pr otection of r eputation against failure tha t t he pseudonym p rovides may well be responsible for much genuine creativity. The pseudonym liberates the author from low-level inhibitions. Of course, t he fact t hat access to the pseudonym strategy can be good for literature d oes n ot ex plain its use by the authors concerned: such explanation has to look t o t h e individual a u t hors' motives-including specifically, their concern for esteem. On t h e oth er h a n d , the good consequences of pseudonimity in certain contex ts might ex plain why institutional-designers and policy-makers might want to estab lish or su pp or t the availability ofthat option.
Anonymity as an Esteem-Optimizing Strategy
In many, perhaps most, cases in which esteem is attached to a n activity, it is somewhat disestimable to be seen to be pursuing that activity for the express purpose of securing the esteem. "The general axiom in t his d omain" , as J on E lster (1983, 66) puts it, "is that nothing is so unimpressive as behaviour designed to impress". Elster's formulation is , we think, extreme, but t her e is a part ial truth he re that n eeds to be acknowledged. The est eem-maximizer will d o well to disguise his m otives in lots of cases.
Ther e are sever al r easons why this m ay be so.
• It may b e tha t the esteem att aches n ot only to an action but also to the disposition to undertake that action. So , for exam ple, som eone who act s b eneficently ma y b e est eemed both b ecause she so acts, a nd b ecause the action reveals that sh e is a b e nevolent p er son. Supp ose we discover of a particula r actor tha t sh e is acting b en eficently m ainly to secure est eem. We might, for ex a mple, discover that sh e is much less likely to act b eneficently wh en she b eliev es she is n ot b eing observed. She would t hen r eceive less esteem from us, a nd m ay receive no est eem a t all. This may be b ecause we a pprov e of b eneficent action a nd wa nt it to be counter fac tually robust (and n ot just dep endent on wh ether ther e a re p eople arou nd to a p plau d ). O r it might b e tha t be a re attracted to p erson al qualities int r insically. E it h er way, the b est stra tegy for her to maximize h er est eem may b e for h er to disguise h er esteem-motives.
• Alterna tively a nd somewhat inde p endently, it may be t h a t people t hink less well of you w h en you sh ow off, or blow your own t r um pet. A ch arm ing m odest y is mor e estima ble tha n an over-weaning self-aggr a ndisem ent. The eighteenth century sa tirist, Edward Young, puts the point very n eatly: "The Love of Praise, h owe'er conceal'd by a rt, Reigns, mor e or less, and glow s in every heart : The p roud, to gain it, toils on toils endure; T h e m odest shun it, but t o m a ke it sure." (You ng 1968, 348-49) If eithe r of these considera tions a re in p lay, then the m anagem en t of on e's pursuit of est eem r equires some subtlet y. If there is liter ally n o audien ce at all, ever , t h en on e's esteem is r estricted to self-esteem. Tha t cann ot be best for t h e est eem-seeker if h er performance is su ch as to justify positive est eem in observers .
On the other hand, maximal publicity might not bebest either. If one were t obe discovered acting in a beneficent way in circumstances where the ex ante chances of detection were low, then the esteem that accrued might well be considerably larger, because observers will believe you to be genuinely benevolent or modest or both. If so, then you have grounds for preferring contexts with som ewhat less than maximal publicity. Clearly, some trade-off between act ual p ublicit y a nd ex ante probability of being observed is involved here.
A simplemodelwill make the point. Suppose tha t, in all cases, t h e probability of being observed is a context-specific p arameter, P, and tha t t his proba bility is always going to be a matter of common awareness. N ow, the value of the esteem that will accrue if you are observed is E , and E is negatively related to P: you get more esteem, E, if you act in an environment where you are less likely t o be observed. Suppose that as P tends to zero, E takes value A a nd t h at when P is one, E takes value B. We take it as given that A > B. Tha t is, t h e esteem t hat is forthcoming if you are observed is larger the smaller the likelihood ex ante t hat you would be observed. On this basis,
E = A-(A -B) · P
This equation is con sistent with our stipulation that when P = 0, E = A; and when P = 1,E = B. Now, wh a t value of P i would maximize expect ed esteem? On the one h a nd, esteem is higher if the probability of being observed is lower; but t hen t here is a chance tha t you won't b e observed at all, and then you will get n o esteem. So it can't be the case tha t it is best for you when P is zero. But equally, expected est eem is not necessarily maximized w hen the probabilit y of b eing observed is one.
Expected esteem is:
w hich is maximized: either when P = 1; or w h en P = A/ 2(A -B), w hich value of P we denote P*. In this la t ter case, the optimal value of expect ed esteem is A / 2. In t h e form er case, the value of esteem is B. So if B > A / 2, then it w ill be desirable to have P as high as possible. But if B < A / 2, then there is a r a nge wh ere expected esteem a nd probability of b eing observed are inver sely r elated. A diagram m ay help h ere. Conside r Fig 1. On the hor izontal axis we show the value of P, r a nging from zero to one. On the vertical axis we d epict both t h e value, E of the esteem accruing, if observed , a nd t he exp ect ed value of the esteem-the product of P and E. We can see by appeal t o t h e diagram t h at if B < A/2, we h ave a n interior solution, with P * less than 1. If B > A / 2, we have a corner solution in which t he high est expected esteem occurs when P is 1. In  Fig 1, we h ave sh own the former case.
So far, we h ave ta ken it that the probability of b eing observed is an exogenous factor. But individuals can work to alter the proba b ility of being observed: they can thrust themselves into the light-they can blow their own trum p et. Or they can hide their light under a bushel, or modestly change the subject when their accomplishments become the topic of conversation. These strat egies are themselves esteem-relevant: modesty t ends to b e positively esteemed; selfaggrandisement and bragging tend to be disesteemed. This fact introduces a further complication. Consider, for example, the case where P happens to fall precisely a t P*. T hen the esteem-maximising individual r eason will act to reduce the probability of b eing observed, because his modesty will earn him further esteem. Indeed, those incentives will b e oper ative even if Pis originally somewhat below P*, provided that P lies not too far below. 6 At the sam e time, if Pis low, it will pay the esteem-maximising individual to work to increase observability, despite the esteem cost of the self-aggrandising actions involved.
Esteem, Identifiability and the Internet

Esteern and Expected Esteern
These considerations explain why it may b e in the ( esteem) interests of an individual to court some measure of secrecy, even when the acts undert aken are esteem-wort hy ones. There is no puzzle involved when a p erson who engages in scurrilous conduct seeks secrecy: such a p erson h as an interest in minimizing the likelihood of discovery. But the thought that secrecy can be an esteemm aximising strat egy in cases where t he action refiects credit on the actor is a mildly puzzling one. This possibility is, however, perfectly consistent with plausible assumptions about the nature of esteem and its pursuit.
Consider in the light of this discussion, the situation of a person who writes under a pseudonym and acquires thereby a first-class reputation as an admirable writer. It is not self-evident that the best strategy in maximizing esteem is to declare one's 'true identity' immediately. Perhaps people will t h ink t hat you are self-aggrandising. Perhaps they will be less inclined to buy your books once it is revealed that their author is just grey old you. Best, of course, if people come to discover that you are the 'famous author' more or less by accident-or later, when you are ready to retire and have built up a reputation n ot just for your writing but, by implication, for your modesty. After all, you always h ave the option of revealing your identity at any point. You can, if you choose, keep your esteem in reserve---stored at the bank rather than spent, as it were. It n eed n ot be the best strategy to go public immediately.
Anonymity as an Ad Hoc Strategy
Apart from the general conside rations rela ted to insurance a nd m odesty, t here are a variet y of more or less ad hoc reasons, some more relevant in on e of our t hree sorts of cases tha n in others, why people might be prom pted to seek anonymity; in particular, why they might be prompted to seek a n onym ity out of a concern for their esteem and reputation. We look at t wo.
In-Group Esteern
Consider first the case of the secret socie ty. Within a n y su ch society, m ember s opera t e both as p erformers and as privileged observers. T hey earn esteem from each other and from no-one else. That is, outsiders cannot provide esteem for me by v irtue of my being a member of the Bourbaki group b ecause t h ey d on't kn ow tha t I a m on e. K eeping m embership secret is then a mechanism for declaring to all m embers that theirs is the only esteem that counts as far as each mem ber is con cerned. But this decla ration can be a very significan t source of esteem to me mbers. It is a comm only observed property of est eem that p eople esp ecially value the est eem of those t hat they esteem. Hume (19 78 , book 2 , chapt er 9) puts it thus in his discussion of fa me: "though fame in general be agr eeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbabtion of t hose whom we ourselves esteem a nd approve of, t han of t h ose whom we hate and despise." So I discover , wh en asked t o join the secret societ y, t hat m y est eem mat ter s to t h ese people who I know I have reason to esteem. And if my esteem matters to them then that is in itself a source of est eem for me. Furt her, all m ember s are quite sp ecial in this regard. These others who I esteem app arently care n ot a whit a b out the esteem of outsiders: they seem to care only about t he esteem they get from me a nd the other m embers.
Return now t o t h e pseudony m case. My ident ity as 'th e farnaus author ' is almost always known to some people--my editor, my agent, my inn er circle of frie nds and family. And I always have the option of t ellin g t h e secret to sp ecial others, of course swearing them to secrecy in the process. Those in t he kn ow form a secret society of a kind. It is not just that they are part y to a secret-t hat they know something that others do not know and perhaps would like to kn ow. It is also that when I admit them to my inner circle I declare to t hem that their esteem is especially valuable to me. Given the reciprocal nature of esteem, this is a signal that I especially esteem them. In this way, secrecy affords me the capacity to give special signals of esteem.
A related benefit of secrecy isth at while those who belong with me in a secr et society, or those I let know of my fame under a pseudonym, will be bound to respect the confidence involved, they need not be inhibited from speaking well of me more generally. Thus there can be a powerful benefit in the likely testimony that such people will give me for embracing the hidden bonds that bind me to them. And this benefit is the greater because the testimony thus offered is n ot seen to redound to their own glory.
Segmented Audiences
The case of segmented audiences invokes somewhat similar considerations to those already canvassed. Consider the case where A is a good performer in two separate arenas where those two a r enas appealnot just to separate audiences but to somewhat opposing ones. I am a good author; and also J ewish. I recognize well enough that being Jewish is a n object of gen er al disesteem in t he p op ulat ion in which I am located , or at least is so among some p eople. Actually, I d esp ise such people for their prejudice. And I relish my Jewish identity. O n t he oth er hand, I want people to buy my books and to read them 'without prejudice' as we might put it. If it became known in the Jewish community tha t I was writing as if a gentile, then this would not be approved within tha t community a nd m ight be regarded as outrageous by some.
In such a case, the logic of a pseudonym seem s clear. I want to segment the relevant arenas in which I can earn esteem. On the one h and, I wan t to develop my talent a nd be appreciated simply as a n author. O n the other, I want to b e r ecognized as a d ecent committed member of my cultural and r eligious community.
This situation arguably desc rib es the George Eliot case. MaryA nn Evans was a controversial individual, with a somew hat dubious public r ep utation. She was liv ing out of wedlock with a married man; she had strongly expressed unconventional r eligious v iews. She was n ot exactly infamous-but m ight h ave become so were she to come to more exten sive public attention. Better to avert such a r isk by writing under a pseudonym. And better to do so under a pseudonym t h at does not decla r e itself immediately as such-so precisely not 'a Lady' , or 'Boz' or 'Publius' or 'Mark Twain' (a name that would have declared its pseudonymaus qualities a t least t o a nyon e familiar with Mississippi rive r boat calls) . Now, it need n ot b e the case that the 'natural audiences' in t h e t wo arenas disesteem each other. Perhaps the disesteem is only in one quarter. Or perhaps the disesteem is not gen eral but only occurs within a minority of those involved in one activity or the oth er. S till, in these cases, it can be esteem-maximising to segment the audiences; and the pseudonym provides a mechanism for securing that segmentation.
It should also be recognised that audiences sometimes segment naturally. You are, let us suppose, a singer and a golfer, and the overlap between the group s who areexpert in these fields and whose esteem is really worth somethin g may be very small. Segmentation of audiences just occurs automatically. Never theless, your esteem will be magnified if your goifing colleagues are aware t h at you have some prowess as a singer, and vice versa. Positive esteem is likely to 'com pound', in the sense stipulated in the introductory section. In this kind of case, you will not rationally work to keep the audiences separate unless some of t he considerations we have explored ea rlier (secrecy effects, or risk management issues) com e into play-or unless golfers tend to hold singers in contempt (and /or vice ver sa) . On the other hand, segmentation in such cases is unlikely t o cost you much. If experts count disproportionately for esteem and expert groups are totally disjoint, the 'compounding effect' does not genera te much addit ional esteem---or more accurately, the additional esteem is not worth very much, com ing as it does from a group that is uninformed about one or other of your accom plishm ents.
Back to The Future: The Internet Context
The aim in this paper has been to explore some of the implications of a d esire for esteem a nd for esteem-based reputation, for the operation of Inter net rela tions.
One of t he features, we h ave said, of Internet relations is that t h ey are often pseudonymous: many indiv iduals conduct their most significan t Inter n et t r ansactions v ia e-specific identities. Perhaps in some cases, t h e adoption of such e-specific ide ntity is n ecessary because off-line n a mes contain too many char act ers or arenot unique; but it is inc reasingly just a n em ergent convention. Many of t h e pseudonyms are clearly recognisable as p seudonyms: Names like '#9**ms' or even 'hotchick-in-fairfax' are not for off-line use. B ut there is scope for use of p seudonyms that might be interpr et ed as 'real' n a m es, a nd in this r espect scop e for some measure of deception. Such deception p ossib ilities may make one gen erally anxious about Inte rnet relations.
And there are of course contexts in which such anxieties may well be justified. In economic trading settings for exam p le, the rewards to d eception can b e considerable. And some commentators fear for the long-term viability of e-trading precisely because of these sorts of difficulties with verifying ident ity.
However, even in these cases, the problems can be over stated. Even in market contexts, agents seem t o care about their reputa tions for t rustwor thiness a nd h on est dealing as a n e nd in itself (or more accurately, as a means t o great er est eem), as well as for economically instrumental reasons. More generally, the Internet seem s to b e an especially fruitful source of p ossible esteem. It offers p ot entially large a udiences of an appropriately fine-grained kind. What is crucial, of course, for the effectiveness of esteem on t he Internet is that agents care about the r ep utation s that their e-identities secure. The fact that su ch e-identities are often pseudonymous-a nd where n ot, a re difficult to ch eck--certainly moder-ates the forces of disesteem for some range of actions and actors. The kind of anonymity involved means that e-identities that lack r eputation have n othing to lose by acting in a disestimable manner. However, t h e same is not t r ue for e-identities who have established a reputation already: t hey have esteem to lose. And even those without a (positive) reputation aspire t o h ave one. Behaving poorly on the Internet always means positive esteem fo r behaving exceptionally well forgone.
And there is no reason to believe that real actors d o not care a bout t h eir virtual reputations. That is something that we think the analogy w it h t h e use of pseudonyms in literature establishes quite clearly. There is n o reason to think that pseudonymous reputations cannot be a source of esteem to the gen erator of the pseudonymous material. George Eliot has a reputation as an a u t h or ; people esteem George Eliot in that connection; and Maryann Evans has every reason to care about that reputation and to act in whatever way she can t o sustain and augment it. There may be a cost in esteem terms of the pseudon ym ous str ategy, of course: namely, that in the normal case, the esteem t hat an indiv idual derives from the multitude of activities she engages in tends tobe more t han t he sim ple sum of the separa te pieces. I w ill esteem you m ore w h en I observe your estimable qualities across a w ide range of aren as. If this is so, t h en in t h e general case esteem considerations would encourage indiv iduals to operate under a single ide ntity. And the adoption of a separate e-identity m igh t on su ch grou nds b e seen to take on a sinister cast.
However, as we have been at pains to show in the foregoing discussion, there can b e countervailing, esteem-based reasons for maintaining separ a te identitiesand for a separate e-identity sp ecifically.
For example, h aving a distinct e-identity can b e a risk-managem ent strategy, in the sense tha t one's off-line esteem is protected from t h e consequences of eaction s. If on e's initial e-actions turn out t o produce disest eem, t he r eputational cost is n egligible. One can simply jettison tha t p a rticular e-identity, a nd b egin e-life a n ew with another. The resulta nt removal of d ownside risk can be h ighly libera ting. One can b e more adventurous , more speculat ive, in on e's initial einte ractions precisely b ecause on e's reputation elsewh ere is pr otected. One's inhibitions are lowered. Rather like the eighteenth century m asked ball-an institution that seems to h ave b een invented precisely with the intent of lower ing inhibitions and promoting gen eral licen ce-participa nts d o things t h ey wou ld otherwise n ot d o. B ut in the Internet setting, at least, there seem s n o gen eral reason to fear the effects of this re moval of inhibition. If our reasonin g is broadly right, individuals will b e seeking p ositive esteem in their Internet transactions; they w ill n ot in most cases b e using the cloak of pseudon ymity to d o outrageous things. But they m ay well experiment with things tha t t h ey would be inhibited from pursuing in offline life, and some of those experiments will prove successful. In these successful cases, e-life can have a quality, and constitute a source of con siderable p ositive est eem, tha t offline life lacks. And indeed , we wou ld expect tha t m ost on going Internet rela tionswill h ave these cha r acteristics: t hose wh ose e-life d oes not h ave them will have less incentive to maintain their e-life.
Of course, on ce on e's e-life proves su ccessful , there will b e some incentive to integrate reputations-and the maintenance of separate real and v irtu al identities seems on that basis to re present a r esidual puzzle. What we have tried to argue in the foregoing discussion, is that this is less of a p uzzle t han it m ight seem. Esteern ma.ximization does not always ca ll for identity-integration . And it will be a useful way of summa rizing our argument to enumerate t he reasons as to why it might not. First, if one's e-reputation is strong a nd one's off-line reputation lackluster, it may diminish one's overall esteem t o integrate on-line and off-line identities. One's on-line reputa tion may be d amaged b y one's off-lin e mediocrity (a nd a fortiori if one's off-line reputation is a source of disesteem) . Better then t o keep one's e-reputation unsullied. Second, there is some presumption that those who develop on-line relations will think that on-line activities are estimable. Not all t hose who adm ire you in ordinary life will necessarily share tha t view. And p erhaps not all t hose w ho operat e on the Internet will think that b eing a successful stock broker or a wellreputed clergyma n is such a big deal. In all discretionary activities, t h ere is a presumption that those who a re involved think the activity to be worth-w hile and su ccess in it tobe highly estimable. But those n ot involved m ay h ave oth er attitudes. P erhaps it would be better to keep one's a u dien ces segmented.
Third, even in the contra ry case where on e's off-line a nd on-line rep utations a re rather impressive, declaration might seem t o b e self-aggrandisin g a n d t h er efore serve to diminish on e's esteem. Althou gh integr ation would add to your reputation a nd esteem overall if it were t o occur by accident, deliberate action on your p a rttobring tha t integration about, ru ns the risk of seeming immodest. A little cultivat ed modest y m ay b e esteem-e nhancing .
Finally, r etaining separate identities in general allows m e to sh are t h e secret in particular . I can admit specially selected e-per sons to t he inner circle of t h ose w ho ' know wh o I really a m '; I can reveal to special personal friends my online activ ities. T his can b e an added source of esteem to me in itself; but it also provides a source of est eem to them, a nd thereb y is likely to induce some measure of reciprocal esteem. Effectively, one is creating a kind of small 'secr et societ y' a round the dual identities; a nd secret societies can b e t he source of sp ecial esteem b e nefits.
The b ot tom line h ere is that Internet ac tiv ities can be a significant source of esteem for those w h o operate 'well' in virtual space. Agent s h ave r eason to care about their e-reputations, even w he re t hose r eputations a t tach to a pseudonymous e-sp ecific identity. This being so, the desire fo r esteem will play a significant role in sta bilising decent communication practices a nd supporting the oper ation of other social norms on t h e Internet. In this r espect, t h ere is no reason tothink tha t the Interne t context w ill b e significantly diffe rent fr om int eractions in t h e ' real ' world.
